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CHAPTER 1 
“Exemption clauses differ greatly in many respects. Probably the most objectionable are 
found in the complex conditions which are now so common. In the ordinary way the 
customer has no time to read them, and if he did read them he would probably not 
understand them. And if he did understand and object to any of them, he would generally 
be told he could take it or leave it. And if he then went to another supplier the result would 
be the same”1 
1. Introduction 
Risk2 is inherent in all facets of life, from boarding a plane to building a nuclear power 
plant and all things in-between. It is only human nature to want to limit or to absolve 
entirely a person’s exposure to risk. 
Exemption clauses are not new, for instance voetstoots clauses3 were well known in 
Roman-Dutch law.4 However, the onset of the industrial revolution and the advances 
throughout gave rise to an imbalance of bargaining power between manufacturing 
concerns and the consumer. The large-scale production and manufacturing that 
transpired gave rise for manufacturers to develop standard form contracts and entrench 
within them exemption clauses to limit or to totally abrogate liability.5 
In legal parlance there are two types of clauses excluding liability, the first are those that 
relate to third party claims known as indemnity clauses and the second are those that 
govern the relationship inter partes6 known as exemption clauses. The latter exclude or 
restrict liability that would otherwise arise and will be discussed in this dissertation. 
                                               
1 Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement SA v NV Rotterdamshe Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361 406. 
2 The Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines a risk as, a situation that could have an undesirable 
outcome, or the possibility that something unpleasant will happen. 
3 A voetstoots clause has the effect that a purchaser purchases property (either movable or immovable) as 
it stands, despite the fact that it may have patent or latent defects. 
4 Van der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke et al Contract General Principles 3ed 297. 
5 Van Eeden, Barnard Corporate and Commercial, Consumer Protection Law in South Africa, at par 4.7.5. 
and n 163. See also Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts 4. 
6 Van Eck The Drafting of Contracts in South Africa (2015 dissertation UP) 295. 
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Before examining exemption clauses, it is prudent to restate the importance of freedom 
of contract and that contracts entered into (where the terms are not immoral, illegal or 
contrary to public policy)7 must be honoured. One of the fundamental maxims that apply 
to the law of contract is pacta sunt servanda, which entails simply, that agreements must 
be honoured. Following from this maxim is the court’s duty to ensure that agreements 
freely and voluntarily entered into are upheld. The English case of Printing & Numerical 
Registering Co v Sampson states what freedom of contract entails coupled with the courts 
duty to enforce the contract, which in part reads: 
“[I]t must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that 
a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one thing which 
more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when 
freely and voluntarily entered into shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of 
justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider - that you are not to 
lightly interfere with this freedom of contract…”8 
2. Problem Statement 
Exemption clauses have become the norm in most contracts as can be seen from the 
following passage: 
“None of you nowadays will remember the trouble we had, when I was called to the Bar, 
with exemption clauses. They were printed in small print on the back of tickets and order 
forms and invoices. They were contained in catalogues or time-tables. They were held to 
be binding on any person who took them without objection. No one ever did object. He never 
read them or knew what was in them. No matter how unreasonable they were, he was 
bound. All this was done in the name of ‘freedom of contract’. But the freedom was all on 
the side of the big concern which had the use of the printing press … It was a bleak winter 
for our law of contract …”9 
                                               
7 Hutchison The Law of Contract in South Africa Contract 23. 
8 Printing & Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) 19 Eq 462. Quoted in Wells v South African 
Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69 73. 
9 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803. 
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However, exemption clauses have developed in not only excluding contractual liability but 
also that of delictual damages. This dissertation explores various cases that overlap and 
establishes whether these clauses fulfil a legitimate purpose and when they are valid. 
As a famous theoretical physicist once put it: “[f]inding the right formulation of a problem 
is often the key to solving it.”10 The formulation could therefore be put by posing the 
following questions: (i) How is it possible that a person leaves a hospital worse off than 
when he went into it and is left with no recourse?11 (ii) How is it possible that in the course 
of ‘fun’ at an amusement park one is left with bodily injuries after the amusement ride fails 
and one is left with no recourse?12 (iii) How is it possible that a juristic entity claiming to 
profess certain expert knowledge fails to provide the contracted service and the aggrieved 
party is left with no recourse?13 
3. Purpose Statement 
These questions go to the root of exemption clauses and will with numerous other cases 
be traversed to determine and cite the issues common with exemption clauses. In 
conclusion it will be ascertained14 if such exemptions are valid and if not, when not? The 
literate review only focuses on South African case law and expressly excludes legislation. 
It is acknowledged that the Consumer Protection Act15 (the “CPA”) contains stipulations 
on exemption clauses. Such clauses are legal, binding and enforceable if their wording is 
clear-cut. If the CPA applies to a specific contract, an exemption clause in that contract 
must comply with section 22, read with section 49(3)–(5) of the CPA, and must not be the 
terms or conditions contained in regulation 44(3) or section 51 of the CPA. For 
transactions regulated by the CPA, exemption clauses must be formulated and conveyed 
in accordance with the CPA. This dissertation acknowledged this particular fact and 
sketches the historical development and difficulties around exemption clauses before the 
                                               
10 Hawking My Brief History 106. 
11 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
12 Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). 
13 Elgin Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Machinery Suppliers (Pty) Ltd 1993 (3) SA 424 (A). 
14 To the extent that the inherent uncertainty of the law will allow. 
15 Act 68 of 2008. 
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CPA was enacted and makes the point that the law remains a challenge where the CPA 
does not apply. 
4. Research methodology 
This dissertation uses a literate review (doctrinal research). This methodology will be used 
to illustrate the way in which exemption clauses are used in contracts, what the common 
problems are around these clauses and finally what lessons can be learnt from case law 
and literature for the drafting of these clauses. 
5. Proposed chapter outline 
This dissertation commences with an introduction of the topic in Chapter 1 and sketches 
the problem statement and methodology that will be used. Chapter 2 explores the 
question of onus when in instituting litigation (whether on contract or delict) and where it 
lies. Chapter 3 traverses through various cases to see how the courts have interpreted 
exemption clauses. Chapter 4 discusses the issue of consensus by examining various 
cases to determine if, and how consensus is or is not achieved. Chapter 5 discusses 
various substantive law defences and reliance’s on exemption clauses. In conclusion, 
Chapter 6 will end with examining the most recent case law in an attempt to draw a wide-
ranging conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
1. How exemption clauses are incorporated into contracts 
Parties concluding an agreement usually agree to the essentialia of the agreement, 
seldom do they negotiate and agree all of the express terms of the agreement.16 This has 
the effect that the common law rules that attract to a specific agreement (the naturalia) 
are often varied to suit a particular parties’ needs, or as Van Eck reminds us, this is not 
always the case: 
“[t]he reason why a provision is found in a contract is often not understood by the drafter 
who put it there. Irrelevant and inappropriate provisions often find their way into contracts 
for as little reason as accepting that it is a standard provision… In addition the process of 
drafting has, over time, developed practices … [t]hat include the almost reckless use of 
precedence in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, the phenomenon of ‘cutting, copying and 
pasting’ of clauses, the use of ‘standard forms’ and the argument of ‘this is how it has 
always been done’ or it is a ‘standard clause’.”17 
The effect of this is that common law rules that attach to a specific agreement are altered 
(known as incidentalia) with the effect that a party who would have enjoyed certain rights 
may find himself without a remedy he would ordinarily have had. 
This is the essence of the problem, namely that the parties’ primary concern lies with the 
so-called ‘heart of the deal’ and not with the ‘nitty gritty’ that may likely cause problems 
later on. Particularly speaking, a party who wants to rely on an exemption clause will 
therefore aver that the clause forms part of the contract and excludes liability, whereas 
the party who stands to lose his action will try to find reasons why the clause should not 
exclude his action. This essentially summarises the conflict, in what follows is an 
                                               
16 Van Eck The Drafting of Contracts in South Africa (2015 dissertation UP) 21-23. 
17 Van Eck The Drafting of Contracts in South Africa (2015 dissertation UP) 3-4. 
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examination of the important aspect which arises initially in any case and which, if not 
met, can be fatal to proving ones case. 
2. Onus of proof 
Exemption clauses find application mainly in the areas of contract law and delict. Whilst 
there are many various attempts at defining a contract the most apt appears to be that 
“[a] contract is an agreement founded on consensus, with the intention of being legally 
bound, resulting in a legal relationship and valid, enforceable obligations between the 
parties”18. Delict arises independently to those rights and obligations of contract and can 
be summed up “[a]s the act of a person that in a wrongful culpable way causes harm to 
another”19. In order for an action in delict to be successful, all the elements, namely the 
act, wrongfulness, fault, causation and damage must be present. 
Whether the action lies in contract or delict or a combination of both20 a plaintiff has a 
choice of which remedy to pursue. It is accepted in South African law that liability for 
contractual actions and claims based on delict or another form for e.g. unlawful 
competition21 can be instituted concurrently.22 The only caveat is that for concurrent 
actions to be successfully instituted, the independent requirements of the specific cause 
of action must be satisfied.23 
Once it is established where the cause of action lies, the next important factor to consider 
is where the onus lies. In what follows the onus will be traversed through case law dealing 
with exemption clauses for both contract and delict. 
3. General principles 
It is trite that in adversarial systems, he who avers must prove, this is known as the onus 
and in civil matters the burden that must be overcome is that a case must be proved on 
                                               
18 Van Eck The Drafting of Contracts in South Africa (2015 dissertation UP) 91. 
19 Neethling Potgieter Visser Law of Delict 4. 
20 LAWSA 64 Delict and breach of contract: concurrence of actions. 
21 Trio Engineered Products Inc v Pilot Crushtec International (Pty) Ltd 2019 (3) SA 580 (GJ). 
22 Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438, Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 
1985 (1) SA 475 (A), Holtzhausen v ABSA Bank 2008 (5) SA 630 (SCA). 
23 Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A) 496-497. 
11 
the balance of probabilities. The onus is not to be confused with the evidentiary burden, 
which can be likened to a game of chess in which once the plaintiff/applicant case is 
presented, the responsibility of rebutting the evidence then rests on the 
defendant/respondent. If once all has been laid before the court, the person averring fails 
to meet the onus, s/he would not succeed in his matter. 
As regards exemption clauses, the onus of proving an exemption clause depends on 
whether the claim is brought in contract or delict. Once it is established that a valid 
contract exists or a delict has occurred the onus plays a vital part. This means that he 
who relies on an exemption clause, must aver and prove that the set of circumstances 
that arose falls squarely under the exemption clause. 
4. Case law 
A number of cases have been instructive in this regard and will be considered: 
In Essa v Divaris2425 in which a garage owner was sued for damage caused to a vehicle 
that was deposited with him for safe keeping, the court stated that even on the assumption 
that proof of gross negligence would have entitled the applicant to succeed, that he had 
failed to discharge the onus. The approach of the court was to assume that whether or 
not the exemption clause was of any force or effect, the cause of action averred and the 
subsequent onus that vested with the applicant was not discharged, the court held that: 
“Where, however, an owner's risk clause is part of such a contract, the effect of such a 
clause is that, though the garage owner undertakes to take care of the car in the garage, 
the parties also agree that the car will be kept in the garage at the risk of the owner of the 
car. This radically different contract does not lead to an inference of an onus of proof 
resting on the bailee. If (as is contended by the present plaintiff and as I will assume to be 
the case, without expressing an opinion on the point) under such a contract gross 
negligence on the part of the garage owner or his servant will, in spite of the owner's risk 
                                               
24 1947 (1) SA 753 (A). 
25 See n 196 below. 
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clause, render him liable, such negligence is the foundation of the plaintiff's case and he 
must prove it affirmatively.”26 
In Stocks & Stocks (Pty) Ltd v T J Daly & Sons (Pty) Ltd27 the appellant sued defendant 
for damages it alleged incurred during the transportation of its crane by the respondents.28 
In essence the appellant alleged a simple contract of carriage, while the respondent 
alleged an additional term, namely the owner's risk provision (which exempted them from 
liability for damage due to negligence by themselves or their servants) emanating from 
the original agreement.29 
Ordinarily, the general rule is that a plaintiff who sues on a contract must prove his 
contract, even though this may involve proving a negative, the negative being that an 
additional term as alleged by the defendant was not agreed to by the parties. The difficulty 
in this instance was the fact that the alleged owner's risk provision derived from a separate 
verbal contract entered into some two decades or more before the contract of carriage in 
issue and the fact that, the owner's risk provision, if established, would have the effect of 
altering the naturalia of the contract of carriage. 30 
After considering the relevant authorities the court held: 
“[t]here is no warrant for modifying the general rule, viz that the onus rests on the plaintiff 
to prove the agreement that he alleges, in the case where the defendant avers a term of 
the agreement which has the effect of varying or excluding one of the naturalia of the type 
of contract in issue.”31 
The result is that the onus, even that of proving a negative, namely that the exemption 
provision, rested on the appellant to prove that it did not form part of the agreement. 
                                               
26 At 769. 
27 1979 (3) SA 754 (A). 
28 At 757. 
29 At 761. 
30 At 761-762. 
31 At 761-764. 
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In D & H Piping Systems (Pty) Ltd v Trans Hex Group Ltd and Another3233 the parties had 
contracted amongst themselves for over three decades. The appellant sued the 
respondent for defective material supplied which had the result that it had incurred liability 
with its client.34 In defence, the respondent claimed that it was exempted from 
consequential loss per its agreement. The court again reaffirmed that: “The onus was on 
the appellant to prove that the general terms and conditions did not govern their 
relationship.”35 
In Mercurius Motors v Lopez3637 the respondents’ vehicle was stolen while in the 
appellants’ possession. The respondent claimed damages for the loss of the vehicle, 
while the appellant denied liability relying on exemption clauses contained in documents 
signed by the respondent. In concurring with the court a quo the court held that: 
“Tshiqi J, having regard to Mr Lopez's reliance on a contract of deposit and considering 
that Mercurius had pleaded that the contract was subject to exemption clauses, correctly 
held that Mr Lopez as plaintiff bore the onus to prove that the exemption clauses were not 
part of the contract.”38 
In Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock3940 the respondent was a passenger on an 
adventure tour in Namibia and sustained injuries as a result a vehicle accident attributed 
to an employee of the appellant. The respondent claimed damages for the injuries 
sustained. The appellant, in denying liability relied on an indemnity form signed by the 
respondent. The court held that the appellant bore the onus of establishing, on a balance 
of probabilities, that the indemnity clause is enforceable against the respondent41. 
                                               
32 2006 (3) SA 593 (SCA). 
33 See n 139 below. 
34 At 596. 
35 At 599. 
36 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
37 See n 86 below. 
38 At par 19. 
39 [2007] 1 All SA 133 (SCA). 
40 See n 80 below. 
41 At par 9. 
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In Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another4243 the respondent claimed 
damages from the appellant in delict for damages as a result of an amusement park ride 
‘gone wrong’. The appellant relied on a contract entered into between the parties, a term 
of which contained an exemption clause exempting the appellant from liability. The court 
again had to consider the question of onus and where it lay, it held that: 
“This brings me to the question whether the terms of the disclaimer were incorporated into 
the contract which was entered into by Mrs Botha when purchasing tickets for the 
amenities in the park. The respondents’ claims were founded in delict. The appellant relied 
on a contract in terms of which liability for negligence was excluded. It accordingly bore 
the onus of establishing the terms of the contract. (The position would have been 
otherwise had the respondents sued in contract.)”44 
5. Conclusion 
From the above it can be ascertained that a person bringing an action in contract bears 
the onus of proving the terms of the contract, even if it is averred on behalf of a defendant 
that a term did or did not form part of the agreement, the plaintiff bears the onus of proving 
the negative. A person bringing an action in delict bears the onus of proving all the 
elements of the delict are present.  
                                               
42 [1999] 1 All SA 411 (A). 
43 See n 57 below. 
44 At 416. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERPRETATION OF EXEMPTION CLAUSES 
1. General 
Another aspect that influences the outcome of a case when considering exemption 
clauses is the interpretation of the clause by the courts. Interpretation involves 
ascertaining the meaning of the written text in order to give effect to the intention of the 
parties.45 What follows below is an analysis on how exemption clauses have been 
interpreted through various cases and where applicable, the wording of the exemption 
clause has been stated into the footnotes for convenience. 
2. Case Law 
In South African Railways and Harbours v Lyle Shipping Co Ltd46 concerned a towage 
agreement entered into between the appellant (the tug owner) and the respondent (the 
owner of the ship), which resulted in damage to the ship due to a collision.47 The 
respondent asserted that the ship in question was damaged as a result of the negligence 
of the appellant, while the appellant denied liability on the basis of an exemption clause 
per the agreement.48 The court had to determine the ambit of the clause to determine 
whether the appellant exempted itself from liability for negligence. The court came to the 
following conclusion: 
“It refers in comprehensive language to possible events as a result of which damages may 
be sustained, but not to the possible legal grounds of responsibility for such damages on 
the occurrence of any such event, with the result that, having regard only to the wording 
of the clause, it is open to the interpretation that it bars actions arising from causes of one 
                                               
45 Hutchison The Law of Contract in South Africa Contract 273. 
46 1958 (3) SA 416 (A). 
47 At 418. 
48 The terms of the exemption were: 
“I hereby agree to accept all such assistance or service of whatsoever nature on the condition that the said 
Administration will not be liable for any loss or damage that may be occasioned to the said ship through 
accident, collision or any other incident whatsoever occurring whilst the tug . . . is engaged in any operation 
in connection with holding, pushing, pulling or moving the said ship.” 
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or more classes, leaving unaffected those founded on causes of one or more other 
classes.”49 
As a result, the court held that where an exemption clause in a contract specified various 
causes of loss for which liability was excluded, but was silent on the question of negligent 
conduct, liability for negligence was not excluded.50 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners & Weavers (Pty) Ltd51 
the parties entered into an agreement where the respondent would manufacture, store 
and deliver on demand grain bags to the appellant. The original agreement was amended 
by the appellant.52 Sometime later, an employee of the respondent facilitated (with others) 
the theft of the grain bags. 
The appellant sued the respondent for damages suffered. The appeal court determined 
that: “The question here is, however, whether or not such liability was excluded by the 
terms of para 2 of the above mentioned letter dated 14 November 1969.”53 
The court held that the intention of the parties as regards the exemption clause was to 
substitute in appellant's favour a right of recourse against the insurance company in the 
place of such rights of recourse as the appellant had against the respondent as bailee.54 
Further that the words were sufficiently comprehensive in their ordinary meaning to bring 
under the protective umbrella of the exemption the liability for the loss or damage for its 
negligent conduct or that of its employees (vicarious liability).55 The result was the 
                                               
49 At 419. 
50 At 420. 
51 1978 (2) SA 794 (A). 
52 The new agreement contained an exemption clause which read: 
“2. In consideration of Messrs Fibre Spinners and Weavers arranging, and keeping in force, insurance as 
detailed in para 3 hereunder, you are hereby absolved from all responsibility for loss of or damage 
howsoever arising in respect of this Department's stocks of raw jute and phormium and finished jute and 
phormium products whilst in the care of your company and in or upon any premises owned or used by your 
company and/or any of its associated or subsidiary companies, …” 
53 At 803. 
54 At 805. 
55 At 806. 
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exemption clause was unambiguous and drafted in such a manner as to exempt the 
respondent from the very occurrence which transpired.56 
In Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another5758 was an appeal from the 
magistrates court and the Natal Provincial Division where the current respondent sued 
the current appellant in delict for damages suffered as a result of an amusement park ride 
‘gone wrong’ in which the respondent and her minor daughter suffered injuries due to a 
hydraulic failure. The appellant relied on a contract entered into between the parties a 
term of which was an exemption clause displayed outside the ticket offices where tickets 
were purchased.59 The respondent admitted in cross-examination that exemption notices 
limiting liability were to be expected at amusement parks.60 
The court in construing the exemption clause recited the well-established dictum that: 
“[I]f the language of a disclaimer or exemption clause is such that it exempts the proferens 
from liability in express and unambiguous terms effect must be given to that meaning. If 
there is ambiguity, the language must be construed against the proferens. But the 
alternative meaning upon which reliance is placed to demonstrate the ambiguity must be 
one to which the language is fairly susceptible; it must not be fanciful or remote.”61 
The court in interpreting the exemption clause found that the respondents’ cause of action 
(that of negligence in relation to the design and construction of the amenity) was one 
which fell within the ambit of the disclaimer. 
                                               
56 At 807. 
57 [1999] 1 All SA 411 (A). 
58 See n 42 above and n 102 below. 
59 The exemption clause which was prominently displayed (a corresponding Afrikaans version was also 
displayed) read as follows: 
“The amenities which we provide at our amusement park have been designed and constructed to the best 
of our ability for your enjoyment and safety. Nevertheless we regret that the management, its servants and 
agents, must stipulate that they are absolutely unable to accept liability or responsibility for injury or damage 
of any nature whatsoever whether arising from negligence or any other cause howsoever which is suffered 
by any person who enters the premises and/or uses the amenities provided.” 
60 At 414. 
61 At 415. 
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In First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum and Another62 concerned the theft of the 
contents of a safety deposit box provided by the appellant in which the respondent kept 
certain valuable possessions. The respondents’ sought to hold the appellant liable for its 
negligence or alternatively for the acts of its employees acting in the course and scope of 
their employment. The respondent denied liability citing an exemption clause in the 
standard contract.63 
The court laid down the following dicta as regards interpretation: 
“Before turning to a consideration of the term here in question, the traditional approach to 
problems of this kind needs to be borne in mind. It amounts to this: In matters of contract 
the parties are taken to have intended their legal rights and obligations to be governed by 
the common law unless they have plainly and unambiguously indicated the contrary. 
Where one of the parties wishes to be absolved either wholly or partially from an obligation 
or liability which would or could arise at common law under a contract of the kind which 
the parties intend to conclude, it is for that party to ensure that the extent to which he, she 
or it is to be absolved is plainly spelt out. This strictness in approach is exemplified by the 
cases in which liability for negligence is under consideration. Thus, even where an 
exclusionary clause is couched in language sufficiently wide to be capable of excluding 
liability for a negligent failure to fulfil a contractual obligation or for a negligent act or 
omission, it will not be regarded as doing so if there is another realistic and not fanciful 
basis of potential liability to which the clause could apply and so have a field of meaningful 
application.”64 
In addition the court affirmed: 
                                               
62 2001 (4) SA 189 (SCA). 
63 The terms of the exemption were: 
“2. The bank hereby notifies all its customers that while it will exercise every reasonable care, it is not liable 
for any loss or damage caused to any article lodged with it for safe custody whether by theft, rain, flow of 
storm water, wind, hail, lightning, fire, explosion, action of the elements or as a result of any cause 
whatsoever, including war or riot damage, and whether the loss or damage is due to the bank's negligence 
or not. 
3. The bank does not effect insurance on items deposited and/or moved at the depositor's request and the 
depositor should arrange suitable insurance cover.” 
64 At par 6. 
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“It is perhaps necessary to emphasise that the task is one of interpretation of the particular 
clause and that caveats regarding the approach to the task are only points of departure. 
In the end the answer must be found in the language of the clause read in the context of 
the agreement as a whole in its commercial setting and against the background of the 
common law and, now, with due regard to any possible constitutional implication.”65 
In interpreting the clause, the court stated that the exemption clause was sufficiently 
worded to relieve the appellant from liability for theft due to its negligence. Further as 
regards vicarious liability, the ambit was wide enough to exempt the appellant for acts or 
omissions of its employees.66 
In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom6768 the respondent was admitted to the appellants’ 
hospital for an operation. Upon admission he signed an admission agreement which 
contained a clause exempting the appellant from liability.69 
The court confirmed that such clauses should be interpreted restrictively but the fact that 
exemption clauses were generally held to be operative did not mean that a specific 
exemption clause could not be declared contrary to public policy and as such 
unenforceable. In determining whether the exemption clause was valid or invalid, the 
                                               
65 At par 7. 
66 At par 23. 
67 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
68 See n 135 below. 
69 The operative part of the exemption were: 
“2. Uitsluiting van aanspreeklikheid 
2.1 …  
2.2 Ek onthef die hospitaal en/of sy werknemers en/of agente van alle aanspreeklikheid en ek vrywaar hulle 
hiermee teen enige eis wat H ingestel word deur enige persoon (insluitende 'n afhanklike van die pasiënt) 
weens skade of verlies van watter aard ookal (insluitende gevolgskade of spesiale skade van enige aard) 
wat direk of indirek spruit uit enige besering (insluitende noodlottige besering) opgedoen deur of skade 
berokken aan die pasiënt of enige siekte (insluitende terminale siekte) opgedoen deur die pasiënt wat ook 
al die oorsaak/oorsake is, net met die uitsluiting van opsetlike versuim deur die hospitaal, werknemers of 
agente.” 
Loosely translated to mean: 
“2. Exclusion of liability 
2.1 …  
2.2 I absolve the hospital and/or its employees and/or agents of all liability and hereby indemnify them 
against any claim instituted by any person (including a dependent of the patient) for any damage or loss 
whatsoever (including consequential or special damages of any nature) flowing directly or indirectly 
resulting from any injury (including fatal injury) sustained by or causing harm to the patient or any illness 
(including terminal illness) contracted by the patient, whatever the cause/causes are, except only with the 
exclusion of intentional omission by the hospital, employees or agents.” 
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question to be asked was whether upholding the relevant exemption clause would conflict 
with the interests of the public as a result of extreme unfairness or other policy issues.70 
In Van der Westhuizen v Arnold71 the respondent purchased a vehicle from a third party 
who was offering a vehicle for sale which belonged to the appellant. The appellant sought 
that the respondent sign a document which contained certain exemptions.72 
The respondent read and signed the document and made payment for the vehicle. Some 
three months later the bank claimed ownership of the vehicle and the respondent then 
settled the amount with the bank to avoid eviction of the said vehicle. The respondent 
then claimed that amount from the appellant based on the implied warranty against 
eviction to which the respondent raised the exemption clause in defence of the claim.73 
The court in construing the exemption clause considered the surrounding circumstances, 
that being how the sale was entered into and the fact that the appellants’ main issue of 
contention was the state of the vehicle for which he sought to be exempt from any 
recourse.74 The court held that their actions that led to the contract could not mean that 
the parties had in mind that the exemption clause would exclude the common law remedy 
(the naturalia) against eviction. The court further held that “[e]n dat geen waarborge 
hoegenaamd aan my gegee is of word deur gemelde verkoper of sy agent(e) nie.” was 
drafted in its widest possible terms and that a warranty which arose through the operation 
of law and one which the parties in concluding their agreement had not come to the minds 
of either party and could not come to the assistance of the appellant in this case. If the 
                                               
70 At par 9 and par 10. 
71 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA). 
72 The document read: 
“Ek die ondergetekende, 
Johan Heinrich Arnold 
Id nr 2607295024004 
Erken en bevestig hiermee dat ek die motorvoertuig beskryf as 'n Mercedes-Benz W123 met 
voertuigregistrasienommer 1232236A263451 en enjinnommer 10298062135500 hiermee voetstoots koop 
van Gideon Andries van der Westhuizen en dat geen waarborge hoegenaamd aan my gegee is of word 
deur gemelde verkoper of sy agent(e) nie. 
Ek onderneem verder op my koste die voertuig aan die relevante padvaardigheidstoetse te laat onderwerp 
en dit op my naam te laat oordra binne 30 dae vanaf datum hiervan.” 
The highlighted part translates to: “no warranty whatsoever has been or is given to me by seller or his 
agent(s).” 
73 At par 6. 
74 At par 34 and par 35. 
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appellant wished to exclude terms, which attracted to a specific type of agreement ex 
lege, then the exemption clause should explicitly state as much in plain language.75 
In Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another7677 the respondent was a member of 
the appellant, a golf club. Her husband (also a member) while playing a round of golf, was 
killed by lightning while playing on the course after taking shelter provided by the appellant 
for golf players. 
The respondent alleged that his death was due to the appellants’ negligence and claimed 
delictual damages based on the dependent’s claim for loss of a breadwinner. The 
appellant denied liability on the basis that the membership agreement between the 
respondent and the appellant contained an exemption clause excluding liability for certain 
claims by members.78 
As regards interpretation of the clause, the court found that the exemption clause falls 
into two parts, the first dealing with liability for loss or damage to property and the second 
for personal injury or harm however caused to members or their children or their guests. 
The court found that the second part made no mention of claims from a dependant spouse 
and as such, claims from dependants were never contemplated.79 
As a result, the appellant was liable for the claim instituted by the respondent. 
In Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock8081 the appellant in denied liability and relied on 
an indemnity form signed by the respondent.82 The court held that the clause in question 
                                               
75 At par 40 and par 43. 
76 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA). 
77 See n 153 below. 
78 The pertinent clause read as follows: 
“DAMAGE TO OR LOSS OF PROPERTY, AND INJURY TO PERSONS 
Members shall pay for the replacing or repairing (as the Committee may determine) of any article, or 
property of the Club, which shall be broken or damaged by them or their guests. 
The Club shall in no circumstances whatsoever be liable for any loss of or damage to the property of any 
member or guests brought onto the premises of the Club whether occasioned by theft or otherwise, nor 
shall the Club be held responsible or in any way liable for personal injury or harm however caused to 
members or their children or their guests on the Club premises and/or grounds.” 
79 At par 8 and par 9. 
80 [2007] 1 All SA 133 (SCA). 
81 See n 39 above and n 217 below. 
82 The material terms read as follows: 
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should be construed restrictively.83 In case of doubt, an exemption clause reasonably 
capable of bearing more than one meaning is given the interpretation least favourable to 
the proferens (in this instance the appellant). In applying this doctrine, the court held that 
the clause: 
“[m]akes no mention whatsoever of negligent driving by employees of the appellant. 
Instead it exempts the appellant from responsibility in respect of loss, injury, illness, 
damage, accident, fatality, delay or inconvenience experienced from time of departure to 
time of return, or subsequent to date of return, such loss, injury, etc. arising out of any 
such tour/venture organised by the appellant.”84 
As a result a reasonable person reading and acceding to its terms would in all likelihood 
read in its context, the nature of driving would be restricted to that associated with that 
undertaken on the adventure activities.85 
                                               
“I have read and fully understand and accept the conditions and general information as set out by drifters 
in their brochure and on the reverse side of this booking form. I acknowledge that it is entirely my 
responsibility to ensure that I am adequately insured for the above venture. I further absolve drifters, their 
staff and management and affiliates of any liability whatsoever, and realise that I undertake the above 
venture entirely at my own risk. 
CONDITIONS 
Due to the nature of hiking, camping, touring, driving and the general thirdworld conditions on our 
tour/ventures, DRIFTERS, their employees, guides and affiliates, do not accept responsibility for any client 
or dependant thereof in respect of any loss, injury, illness, damage, accident, fatality, delay or 
inconvenience experienced from time of departure to time of return, or subsequent to date of return, such 
loss, injury etc arising out of any such tour/venture organised by DRIFTERS. Should a tour/venture be 
cancelled by DRIFTERS due to weather conditions or other reasons, it shall either refund full payment or 
offer a substitute tour/venture. Should DRIFTERS have to curtail a tour/venture for any reason due to 
weather conditions or other factors after the time of departure, DRIFTERS will not be liable for any form of 
refund whatsoever, although everything will be done to complete a tour/venture or to utilise an alternative 
arrangement or venue. All tours are subject to a minimum of 6 pax travelling, although a tour may still run 
with fewer, at the discretion of DRIFTERS. Should a client decide to curtail a tour for any reason whatsoever 
DRIFTERS will not be liable for any refund whatsoever.” 
83 At par 9. 
84 At par 10. 
85 At par 10 and par 14. 
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In Mercurius Motors v Lopez8687 the court had to interpret exemption clauses contained 
in a repair order form88. The court determined that the theft to which the exemption related 
to was for valuables stolen out of the vehicle, rather than of the vehicle itself.89 
In Masstores v Murray & Roberts9091 the appellant sought damages for a breach of 
contract against the respondent while it was affecting extensions to one of its stores. 
During the execution of the extensions a subcontractor of the respondent caused a fire 
which destroyed the store and its contents. 
The appellant alleged negligent and or grossly negligent conduct resulting in the breach 
of contract. The respondent excepted to the claim and raised as its defence an exemption 
clause.92 
The court thus had to determine the effect of the exemption clause through interpretation. 
The court stated that: “[t]he provision in issue must be construed by examining the words 
used, the structure of the indemnity provision itself and its meaning within the context of 
                                               
86 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
87 See n 36 above and n 144 below. 
88 The pertinent clause(s) were contained in two documents, the first entitled 'Warranty Repair Order' the 
following appears in capitals: 
“NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO CARS OR ARTICLES LEFT IN CARS IN CASE OF 
FIRE, THEFT OR ANY OTHER CAUSE BEYOND OUR I CONTROL.” 
The other exemption clause on which Mercurius relied is contained in a second document described as a 
repair order form which read: 
“PLEASE REMOVE PULL-OUT RADIOS AND VALUABLES FROM YOUR VEHICLE. 
WE WILL NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY THEFT WHATSOEVER.” 
Followed by: 
“I have read and agree to the conditions of Contract on the reverse side hereof. This is to certify that no 
valuable or personal belongings have been left in the vehicle.” 
Further the repair order form has a carbon copy underneath and has to be detached in order to reveal the 
conditions on the reverse side. The relevant condition on which Mercurius relied is in clause 5, which read: 
“I/we acknowledge that mercurius shall not be liable in any way whatsoever or be responsible for any loss 
or damages sustained from I fire and/or burglary and/or unlawful acts (including gross negligence) of their 
representatives, agents or employees.” 
89 At par 32. 
90 94 [2008] ZASCA. 
91 See n 205 below. 
92 The clause relied upon 9.2.7 read as follows: 
“9.2 The employer indemnifies and holds the contractor harmless against loss in respect of all claims, 
proceedings, damages, costs and expenses arising from: 
9.2.7 Physical loss or damage to an existing structure and the contents thereof in respect of which this 
agreement is for alteration or addition to the existing structure.” 
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the contract as a whole.”93 In other words, the exemption clause must be viewed in its 
commercial setting taking account the structure and purpose of the entire contract.94 
The appellant contended that the effect of the exemption clause was to indemnify the 
respondent against claims by third parties only or, alternatively, to exclude the 
respondents’ liability only for its non-negligent conduct.95 The court in considering that the 
exemption clause only applied to third parties held that if that were the case, it would have 
clearly said so.96 The court in considering whether negligent conduct exempted the 
respondent from liability held that the clause was clearly intended to exclude the 
contractor's liability for negligently damaging or destroying the existing structure and its 
contents.97 As a result, the respondent was exempt from liability for the damage caused 
to the appellant. 
In Swinburne v Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd9899 the plaintiff (a lessee) sued the 
defendant (a lessor) for injuries sustained while ascending a flight of stairs. The plaintiff 
alleging that the defendant had negligently failed to install a handrail to guard against the 
very tragedy that occurred. The defendant denied negligence and further relied on an 
exemption clause contained in the lease agreement.100  
                                               
93 At par 7. 
94 At par 24. 
95 At par 11. 
96 At par 14-15. 
97 At par 24 and par 29. 
98 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZD). 
99 See n 178 below. 
100 The terms of the exemption clause were: 
“17. The LESSOR shall keep all main walls and roofs in order but shall not be responsible for any damages 
caused by leakage, rain, hail, snow or fire, or any cause whatsoever, nor shall the LESSOR be responsible 
for any loss or damage which the LESSEE may sustain by reason of any act whatsoever or neglect on the 
part of the LESSOR or employees, or by reason of the PREMISES or the building in which they are situate 
at any time falling into a defective state of repair, or by reason of any repairs to be effected by the LESSOR, 
not being effected timeously or at all, and the LESSEE shall not be entitled for any of the reasons 
aforementioned or for any reason whatsoever, to withhold any moneys payable by him under this 
Agreement, or to claim any refund, in respect of moneys paid. 
26. The LESSOR shall not be responsible or liable to the LESSEE, his family, friend, servant or guests for 
loss sustained by any of them as a result of any theft, burglary or fire on the PREMISES or in or about the 
building or for any damage suffered as a result of any negligent act or omission on the part of the LESSOR, 
and/or its agent/s and/or its caretaker and/or other employees or as a result of any state of disrepair, defect 
or flaw in or failure, non-functioning or breakage of the PREMISES or the building, in which the PREMISES 
are situate, or any fittings, or in any fixtures, appliances or lifts therein. The nature of the service given in 
the flats by the servants of the LESSOR or the agent/s shall be at the discretion of the LESSOR or the 
25 
The court in interpreting the ambit of clause 17 held that the clause excluded liability for 
negligence to omissions or acts relating to obligations for repair and maintenance, and 
did not extend to the provision of basic safety features such as handrails for the stairs.101 
The court in interpreting the ambit of clause 26, reaffirmed the approach taken in Durban’s 
Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another102 which stated that, if express and 
unambiguous terms excluded the proferens from liability, then effect must be given to 
such an exemption clause, however if the exemption was not drafted in such clear terms 
then the clause was to be construed against the proferens. In determining the ambit of 
the exemption clause, the court must consider how a reasonable person would 
understand the provision103. As a consequence, clause 26 did not contemplate that it was 
concerned with accidents causing personal injury but rather it regulated the ordinary and 
natural consequences of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant104. 
Additionally the words used are directed or relate to loss caused by harm to physical 
property only and do not extend to accidents causing personal injuries105. The court 
concluded that a reasonable person reading the exemption clause would not infer that 
‘any damage’ would extend so as to include damages arising from personal injury. The 
clause being found to be ambiguous, had to be construed against the defendants. 
3. Conclusion 
It is now established that South African courts accept that in interpreting provisions of an 
agreement, the explicit text as well as the implicit context are to be considered in aiming 
to determine its meaning.106 This chapter has shown that the courts interpret a badly 
drafted exemption clause against the drafter, further that the exemption clause is not read 
in isolation but considered in the context of the whole agreement, further that surrounding 
                                               
agent/s and the LESSOR'S or the agent's/agents' representatives and servants accept no responsibility or 
liability of whatsoever nature in respect of the receipt or the non-receipt and delivery or non-delivery of 
goods, postal matter or other correspondence.” 
101 At par 22. 
102 See n 57 above. 
103 At par 26. 
104 At par 29. 
105 At par 30. 
106 Cornelius Principles of the Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa 22. 
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circumstances are considered when construing an exemption clause and finally that as 
an exemption clause which has the effect of limiting a right that a party would ordinarily 
have enjoyed, then such clauses are to be given a restrictive interpretation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INCLUSION OF EXEMPTION CLAUSES: THE ROLE OF CONSENT 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters illustrated the burden a party bears and how exemption clauses 
are interpreted. This chapter examines how do exemption clauses find their way into 
agreements. 
There are various theories as regards consensus, the first is the will theory, where 
consent is determined through the subjective wills of the contracting parties. Next is the 
declaration theory, which concerns itself with the external declared intentions of the 
parties. Finally is the reliance theory, where consensus is determined by the conduct of 
the party inducing the other party to the contract.107 
Through various cases below, the establishment of consensus will be followed to 
determine how the parties are deemed to accede to such exemption clauses. Again 
where applicable, the wording of the exemption clause has been stated into the footnotes 
for convenience. 
2. Consensus through offer and acceptance 
Briefly, an offer is a statement of intention which outlines the terms to which the person 
making the offer is prepared to bind himself. Acceptance is an expression of intention by 
the person to whom the offer was made signifying his intent to be bound.108 
In Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd109110 the plaintiff supplied tainted 
spices to the defendant. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the amount for the products 
supplied while the defendant replicated and counterclaimed due to the tainted spices. It 
was common cause that the agreement was entered into several years prior to this action. 
                                               
107 Hutchison The Law of Contract in South Africa 40. 
108 Hutchison The Law of Contract in South Africa 78. 
109 2010 (1) SA 8 (GSJ). 
110 See n 220 below. 
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The facts briefly were that an employee of the defendant signed the plaintiffs’ standard 
terms and conditions and added the handwritten words “std conditions not checked”. The 
terms of the agreement contained several exemptions for its liability.111 
The court thus had to determine whether through offer and acceptance if consensus was 
achieved. The court began by saying that a person signing an agreement signifies his 
consent to the contents of the agreement.112 The court then considered the meaning of 
the handwritten words added, it came to the conclusion that in essence the defendant 
was tendering a counteroffer to which the plaintiff should have enquired from the 
defendant exactly what it meant by the insertion of the words. By the plaintiffs’ conduct in 
not doing so, it had acceded to the fact that the defendant sought not to be bound by the 
terms of the agreement.113 
In Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a Forbes Waterproofing v Government of the 
United Kingdom114 the appellant entered into a contract with the respondent to effect 
repairs to a roof. During the course of the work, the roof caught fire as a result of 
                                               
111 The terms in part read: 
“4. LIMITED LIABILITY 
4.1 The Company shall not be liable for any defect in the goods by reason of faulty production, 
workmanship, quality of raw materials or otherwise unless: 
4.1.1 It is established that the goods were correctly installed and properly cared for and used; and 
4.1.2 the Customer notifies it in writing of the defect within seven days of the delivery of the goods. 
4.2 The Company's liability shall be limited, at its option, to: 
4.2.1 Repairing such goods free of charge; or 
4.2.2 supplying the Customer with similar replacement goods free of charge; or 
4.2.3 passing a credit for the purchase price of the goods, provided that the Company shall under no 
circumstances whatsoever be responsible for any consequential or other damages whatsoever. 
4.3 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained or implied in these conditions the liability of the 
Company arising out of any defect in the goods shall not exceed the purchase price of the goods concerned. 
4.4 Save as set out herein all conditions, terms, warranties or representations (express or implied, statutory 
or common-law) as to quality, fitness, performance or otherwise in relation to the goods are excluded. 
4.5 When the Customer purchases the goods for resale, the Customer shall ensure that the purchaser of 
the goods is appraised of these conditions so as to ensure that the purchaser's claims (if any) against the 
Company are limited to the extent stated herein. 
4.6 The Customer indemnifies and holds the Company harmless against all claims, loss, damage, expense 
or proceedings of whatsoever nature against or on the part of the Company arising out of the sale or 
distribution of the goods whether defective or not for any reason whatsoever.” 
112 At par 24. 
113 At par 27 and par 30. 
114 2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA). 
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negligence of the appellants workers to which the respondent instituted an action for 
damages caused by the fire. 
The contract had been concluded on the basis of a quotation which had been faxed by 
the appellant to the British Consulate in Cape Town and which had been accepted by an 
employee on behalf of the respondent. At the very bottom of the quotation (and below the 
footer containing the company details, directors names etc.) were printed words “SEE 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OVERLEAF”, which subsequently were never transmitted.115 
The appellant contended that the terms formed part of the agreement, which contained 
an exemption clause limiting its liability for damages caused. 
The court held that the test to determine whether the terms had been incorporated into 
the agreement was an objective one. As a result, the non-transmittal of the reverse of the 
quotation which contained the terms had the effect that the terms did not form part of the 
agreement. As a further attempt to have the terms incorporated, the appellant raised the 
issue of ‘ticket cases’ where the court put paid to the argument in the following manner: 
“I agree entirely with Government counsel's submissions in this regard. To make reference 
to further terms in this way whilst at the same time not transmitting the terms is to set a 
trap, whether consciously or unconsciously. The doctrine in the 'ticket' cases is designed 
to bind one who is indifferent as to the extent of his commitment, not one who, although 
acting reasonably, is ignorant of what is sought to be imposed upon him.”116 
The appeal was accordingly dismissed. 
3. Justus error 
Where there are problems concerning consensus, the doctrine of justus error operates 
as a corrective measure in that if in giving consent a party had committed a material and 
reasonable mistake that party will not be bound to the agreement.117 
                                               
115 At par 9. 
116 At par 21. 
117 Hutchison The Law of Contract in South Africa Contract 99. 
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In Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk118 the appellant entered into an agreement for the 
purchase of a vehicle on the strength of representations made to him through an 
advertisement of the respondent. After the conclusion of the verbal agreement the 
appellant was requested to sign a document, which he did without reading. It thereafter 
transpired that the vehicle the appellant bought was an older model than initially 
advertised. The appellant alleged a justs error while the respondent relied on the maxim 
caveat subscriptor and on an exemption clause in the contract.119 
The court held that the characteristics displayed in the advertisement induced the 
appellant to enter into the agreement. The respondents silence as regards the model of 
the car amounted to a misrepresentation. Further that in regards the exemption clause 
that by saying nothing to the appellant concerning the effect of the exemption clause, the 
respondent's employees instilled in the appellant the trust that the document was not in 
conflict with the advertisement and therefore did not exclude liability in respect of 
representations contained in the advertisement. As a result the appellants mistake was a 
justus error. 
4. Quasi-mutual assent 
The doctrine of quasi-mutual assent states that in the absence of consensus by a party, 
if the other party has a reasonable belief in the existence of consensus and was induced 
by the other party, then the agreement will be upheld. 120 
                                               
118 1985 (2) SA 893 (A). 
119 The exemption clause read: 
“6. Ek aanvaar in die besonder dat terwyl die verkoper aanneem dat die datum van registrasie en/of jaar 
van vervaardiging soos hierin vermeld en die odometer van die voertuig korrek is, hy nogtans geen 
waarborg gee ten opsigte van die juistheid van of die jaar van vervaardiging of die afstand wat aangetoon 
word nie, en ek aanvaar hiermee dat ek nie beweeg is om hierdie ooreenkoms aan te gaan as gevolg van 
enige voorstellings wat deur die verkoper, sy werknemers of agente teenoor my gemaak is ten opsigte van 
of die jaar van vervaardiging van die genoemde voertuig, of die afstand wat op die genoemde voertuig 
aangetoon word, of die toestand van die genoemde voertuig of andersins nie.”  
Which loosely translated had the aim of excluding the liability of the respondent in connection with any 
representation in respect of inter alia, the year of manufacture of the vehicle. 
120 Hutchison The Law of Contract in South Africa Contract 95. 
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In Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another121122 concerned whether 
the terms of the exemption clause were incorporated into the agreement when the 
respondent purchased the ticket. The respondent conceded that she had been aware that 
there were notices of the kind in question at amusement parks but did not admit to having 
actually seen any of the notices at the appellant's park. 
The court stated that: 
“In these circumstances the appellant was obliged to establish that the respondents were 
bound by the disclaimer on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, which involved an enquiry 
into whether the appellant was reasonably entitled to assume from the first respondent's 
conduct in going ahead and purchasing a ticket that she had assented to the terms of the 
disclaimer or was prepared to be bound by them without having read them.”123 
The court held that the answer depended upon whether in all circumstances the appellant 
had done what was reasonably sufficient to give patrons notice of the terms of the 
disclaimer, to which the court concluded: “In all the circumstances I am satisfied that the 
steps taken by the appellant to bring the disclaimer to the attention of patrons were 
reasonable and that, accordingly, the contract concluded by Mrs Botha was subject to its 
terms.”124 
5. Caveat subscriptor 
As a general rule, there is no duty on a contracting party to inform the other party about 
the content of their agreement.125 This has the effect that a party who signs a document 
without reading it is bound by his signature. 
In George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd126 the appellant sued the respondent for damages for the 
loss of certain clothing and personal effects which were stolen from his room while he 
was a lodger in the hotel. The appellant contended that a verbal agreement had been 
                                               
121 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). 
122 See n 102 above. 
123 At 991. 
124 At 992. 
125 Van Eeden, Barnard Corporate and Commercial, Consumer Protection Law in South Africa, at par 4.7.4. 
126 1958 (2) SA 456 (A). 
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reached prior to arriving at the hotel. Upon arrival at the hotel the appellant was requested 
to, what he believed, to sign a hotel register. The hotel register contained an exemption 
clause exempting the respondent from liability in respect of property brought upon the 
premises.127 
In essence the appellant claimed he was not bound by the document he signed due to a 
justus error. The court however found no evidence of misrepresentation and in essence 
upheld the caveat subscriptor rule and as a consequence of not bothering to read the 
document he appended his signature to, he was nevertheless bound by it.128 
In Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun Couriers129 the appellant sought damages 
against the respondent for the loss of travellers cheques. The respondent relied on the 
exemption clause contained in the dispatch note excluding its liability.130 
The appellant contended that he was harbouring under a unilateral mistake in that he was 
unaware of the content of the dispatch note and that the exemption clause operated 
harshly against him. The court held that a person’s unilateral mistake is not reasonable 
nor excusable and the error was not justus. A person failing to read an agreement and 
                                               
127 The exemption clause read: 
“[t]he proprietor shall not be responsible for loss of or damage to my/our property brought upon the 
premises, whether arising from fire, theft. or otherwise by whomsoever caused, or arising from the 
negligence or wrongful act of any person in the employ of the proprietor.” 
128 At 473. 
129 2007 (2) SA 599 (SCA). 
130 A dispatch note constituted the contract and contained the following exemption clause: 
“This shipment is accepted by Sun Couriers subject to the conditions of carriage printed on the reverse of 
the copies hereof, which conditions the Sender acknowledges, by signing this shipment, to have read and 
understood. In particular, your attention is drawn to Sun Couriers maximum liability of R50 per shipment for 
loss or damage. If you wish Sun Couriers to accept a higher liability, the value of this shipment must be 
declared in the space provided. Refer the published tariff for conditions and exclusions.” 
On the reverse the pertinent clause read: 
“8.2 Subject to what is stated below, the courier will accept the responsibility up to the value of the goods 
declared on the dispatch document. If no value is declared, the maximum responsibility that will be accepted 
is R50. 
8.6 The maximum compensation in respect of any single shipment of goods shall be R100 000. 
8.7 The courier accepts no responsibility in respect of and will not pay compensation in the event of loss or 
damage to jewellery, precious stones and metals, negotiable instruments, or any article I exceeding R3 000 
of value per kilogram of gross mass, irrespective of the contents.” 
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further binding himself by appending his signature was bound by the terms in the 
agreement.131 
6. Notice of exemption clauses 
The preceding paragraphs considered the ways in which contracts with exemption 
clauses come about. It is evident that parties’ are primarily concerned with the heart of 
the deal and that they therefore conveniently ignore onerous clauses. What needs to be 
answered is whether there is a duty on one party (or the drafter perhaps) to draw the 
other parties’ attention to the existence of an exemption clause. 
In Fourie No v Hansen and Another132 the injured party was represented by a curator ad 
litem (the plaintiff) and sought relief against the first defendant for his negligent actions 
whilst driving the vehicle and the second defendant (a company letting and hiring of 
vehicles) for its or its agent’s negligence in the letting of a defective motor vehicle. 
As regards the second defendant, it denied liability and further contended as a separate 
defence that the injured party entered into a written agreement with it to rent the vehicle 
concerned which contained an exemption clause.133 
But the court in attempting to determine the applicability of the exemption clause held that 
even if the injured party was bound by the terms, his attention was at no times drawn to 
the exemption clause and that it was not a clause that a reasonable person would likely 
expect to find in such a contract for the letting and hiring of movable property, it said: 
“This kind of exemption clause goes against what any reasonable person would expect, 
ie that those who purport to run car hire businesses in a reputable manner are not 
responsible for the consequences of their breaches of contract. If any such organisation 
is not prepared to contract on the basis of accepting liability for its breaches of contract, 
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“Avis shall not be liable for any damage arising out of any defect in or mechanical failure of the vehicle; nor 
for any loss of or damage to any property transported or left in the vehicle; nor for any indirect damages, 
consequential loss, loss of profits or special damages of any kind for any breach of this agreement.” 
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then the least one would expect of it is proper notice to this effect to those who hire 
vehicles from it.”134 
In essence that court stated that for the exemption clause to be operative, it would have 
to be brought to the attention of the signatory and not hid in a manner as to conceal its 
existence. 
In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom135136 as regards to whether the notice came to the 
respondents attention, the respondents subjective expectations of the contents of the 
contract was irrelevant and what carried more weight was whether objectively speaking 
would an exemption clause of this kind be expected to be found in such contracts, to 
which the court found that they were. Accordingly the admission clerk had no legal duty 
to point out the existence of the exemption clause.137 The court also confirmed that 
persons who signed a written agreement without reading it did so at their own risk and 
were consequently bound by the provisions contained therein as if they were aware of 
them and had expressly agreed thereto.138 
In D & H Piping Systems (Pty) Ltd v Trans Hex Group Ltd and Another139140 the appellant 
who manufactured concrete sewerage pipes had for more than 30 years purchased 
dolomitic aggregate from the respondent. The appellant alleges, as a result of latently 
defective material supplied, it had incurred a liability with its client to the tune of millions 
of rand. 
For the sake of brevity the contractual relationship was as follows, the appellant (through 
its authorised representative) would contact the respondent to fix the price for the supply 
of the material for a future period of six months whereupon a bulk order was placed (this 
being a contract in the form of a pactum de contrahendo). The bulk order contained the 
specifications of the material required. Thereafter the appellant would order specific 
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quantities as needed and the respondent would deliver to the appellants’ premises 
complete with a delivery note. The appellants’ representative would confirm the quantities 
delivered against the delivery note and the appellants accounts would arrange for 
payment. 
One of the defences raised by the respondent was that its general terms and conditions 
exempted them from liability, more specifically for the appellants’ consequential loss it 
sustained.141 
In adducing evidence in support of its defence the respondent contended that the general 
terms and conditions of sale were printed on the reverse of the delivery notes and invoices 
and that as a matter of consistent practice, the appellant was provided with delivery notes 
and invoices containing the general terms and conditions of sale on the reverse thereof. 
As a result the general terms and conditions of sale were incorporated in each agreement 
relating to the supply of the materials and the plaintiff was aware, alternatively, was 
deemed to have to have been aware, that the supply of the material was subject to such 
general terms and conditions. 
The court in ascertaining whether the terms were incorporated into the contract stated 
that “[t]he answer depends upon whether, in all the circumstances, the respondent did 
what was reasonably sufficient to give the appellant notice of them.”142 It further 
concluded that: 
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“Neither a delivery note nor an invoice is a contractual document, ie the type of document 
in which the recipient would expect to find terms and conditions intended to form part of 
the contract between the sender of the document and the recipient. Both the delivery notes 
and the invoices received by the appellant's employees reflected performance, or part 
performance, of a contract already concluded. Neither constituted an offer to do business. 
They would therefore not have required the attention of a person authorised by the 
appellant to negotiate and agree to the terms of any contract with the respondent. The 
respondent could accordingly not reasonably have expected that they would come to the 
attention of such a person, as opposed to the person(s) who would acknowledge receipt 
of goods delivered or process invoices for payment; and this is particularly so both 
because the respondent must have known that the appellant is a large company, with 
different employees authorised to perform different functions on its behalf and also 
because, to the knowledge of the respondent, the terms of its contractual relationship with 
the appellant had already been negotiated with Lombard. Once it is established that no 
person authorised to bind the appellant to the respondent's general terms and conditions 
ever became aware of them, or could reasonably have been expected to do so, it does 
not avail the respondent to point to the number of occasions on which such documents 
were sent to the appellant or the period of time over which this was done.”143 
As a result, the absence of actual knowledge of terms and conditions renders them of no 
force or effect. 
In Mercurius Motors v Lopez144145 the respondent dropped off his leased vehicle (for 
which the respondent bore the risk of loss of the value of the vehicle in terms of the lease 
agreement) with the appellant to affect certain mechanical work on the vehicle. The 
appellants premises were broken into with the result that the respondents vehicle was 
stolen (this was the only vehicle stolen and the keys of the vehicle could not be traced). 
The respondent (based on the contract of deposit) claimed damages for the loss of the 
vehicle. In turn, the appellant denied liability for the loss of the vehicle, relying on 
exemption of liability clauses contained in the documents signed by the respondent. 
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In ascertaining the significance of the exemption146 the court held as follows: 
“An exemption clause such as that contained in clause 5 of the conditions of contract, that 
undermines the very essence of the contract of deposit, should be clearly and pertinently 
brought to the attention of a customer who signs a standard instruction form, and not by 
way of an inconspicuous and barely legible clause that refers to the conditions on the 
reverse side of the page in question. Moreover, the caption immediately above the 
signature is misleading in that a customer is directed to that provision and away from the 
more important provision in small print on the left-hand side of the document which refers 
to the conditions on the reverse side of the document which are themselves not easily 
accessible.”147 
7. Conclusion 
The problematic issue of determining actual consensus or conversely, proving no 
consensus, can only be determined through the actual facts of the case this is only 
achieved by presenting factual evidence in support of the assertion. As can be seen from 
the cases above, South African law (based on the facts) recognises various claims and 
defences where it relates to consensus. 
As regards whether a party has a duty of providing notice of an exemption clause, the 
majority of the judgments above (with the exception of Afrox) have held that notice of an 
exemption clause, and more specifically where the exemption clause goes to the heart of 
the agreement, ought to be brought to the other parties attention. Failure to do so 
detrimentally affects the validity of the exemption clause. There have been many 
criticisms by various writers regarding the Afrox148 judgment, but as can be seen, it has 
been authoritatively stated that a person wishing to enforce an exemption clause would 
be well advised to ensure the exemption clause is pertinently brought to the other parties’ 
attention.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DEFENCES RAISED TO EXEMPTION CLAUSES 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, various substantive laws, where they were applicable to exemption 
clauses will be explored, these in relation to defences raised to exemption clauses and in 
instances where a party seeks protection of the exemption clause. 
2. Constitutionality of exemption clauses 
In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom149150 the issue whether the Constitution151 was 
applicable was considered and discussed. The court held that, as regards to the 
application of s 19(2) of the Constitution, the agreement had been concluded in August 
1995 whereas the Constitution had only become operative in February 1997. With regard 
to direct damages, the Constitution had no retrospectivity.152 
In Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another153154 the court in obiter questioned the 
constitutionality of an exemption clause for the negligent causing of death. The court 
expressed an opinion that to allow such an exemption clause would be against public 
policy as it ran against the common law and the Constitution which placed a high value 
on the sanctity of life.155 
Since the judgments above the courts have in Barkhuizen v Napier156 by the majority, 
held that where a party challenges terms of a contract against the Constitution, the 
approach of the court is to determine if the contractual term is contrary to public policy. 
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“I do not understand the Supreme Court of Appeal as suggesting that the principle of 
contract pacta sunt servanda is a sacred cow that should trump all other considerations. 
That it did not is apparent from the judgment. The Supreme Court of Appeal accepted that 
the constitutional values of equality and dignity may, however, prove to be decisive when 
the issue of the parties' relative bargaining positions is an issue. All law, including the 
common law of contract, is now subject to constitutional control. The validity of all law 
depends on their consistency with the provisions of the Constitution and the values that 
underlie our Constitution. The application of the principle pacta sunt servanda is, therefore, 
subject to constitutional control.”157 
From for foregoing it is clear the constitutional challenges to contract terms will be 
determined against the Bill of Rights. The long held position of pacta sunt servanda as 
the main force for enforcing agreements validly entered into is no more the only 
consideration. What follows is specific challenges to exemption clauses as being against 
public policy. 
3. Public policy and the boni mores 
As regards public policy, our courts have over the years attempted to give a precise 
meaning. In Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis158 the court held that public 
policy has no fixed meaning and is the opinion of the community at a specific time.159 
In Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes160 the court held that in order to determine whether a contract 
is contrary to public policy: 
“One must be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely 
because its terms (or some of them) offend one's individual sense of propriety and 
fairness.”161 
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In grappling with this often difficult problem it must be borne in mind that public policy 
generally favours the utmost freedom of contract, and requires that commercial 
transactions should not be unduly trammelled by restrictions on that freedom.162 
Certain maxims applicable to public policy include: freedom of contract, the doing of 
simple justice between man and man and that agreements inimical to the interests of the 
community whether contrary to law or social morality or economic expedience are not 
enforceable.163 
In Brisley v Drotsky164 Cameron JA held that: 
“It is not difficult to envisage situations in which contracts that offend these fundamentals 
of our new social compact will be struck down as offensive to public policy. They will be 
struck down because the Constitution requires it, and the values it enshrines will guide the 
courts in doing so. The decisions of this Court that proclaim that the limits of contractual 
sanctity lie at the borders of public policy will therefore receive enhanced force and clarity 
in the light of the Constitution and the values embodied in the Bill of Rights.”165 
Finally in both the supreme court of appeal and the constitutional court, the principle was 
laid down regarding public policy. In the supreme court of appeal, the court noted the 
following: 
“[T]he courts will invalidate agreements offensive to public policy, and will refuse to enforce 
agreements that seek to achieve objects offensive to public policy. Crucially, in this 
calculus ‘public policy’ now derives from the founding constitutional values of human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, 
nonracialism and nonsexism.”166 
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In the constitutional court the court167 went further, it noted that: 
“What public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy must 
now be determined by reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy 
as given expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a term in a contract that 
is inimical to the values enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and is, 
therefore, unenforceable.” 168 
“In my view the proper approach to the constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to 
determine whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as evidenced by the 
constitutional values, in particular, those found in the Bill of Rights. This approach leaves 
space for the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda to operate, but at the same time allows 
courts to decline to enforce contractual terms that are in conflict with the constitutional 
values even though the parties may have consented to them.”169 
In light of the above it is clear that for a term of a contract to offend public policy, the term 
is to be determined against the Constitution (and more particularly the Bill of Rights) and 
the values enshrined therein. 
The term boni mores is often used interchangeably with that of public policy, but this 
concept is wholly distinct. In Van Eeden (formerly Nadel) v Minister of Safety & Security170 
the court stated that: 
“In applying the concept of the legal convictions of the community the court is not 
concerned with what the community regards as socially, morally, ethically or religiously 
right or wrong, but whether or not the community regards a particular act or form of conduct 
as delictually wrongful. The legal convictions of the community must further be seen as 
the legal convictions of the legal policy makers of the community, such as the legislature 
and judges”.171 
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Thus from the passage above, the boni mores is not what the community regards as 
legally unacceptable, but rather what the legal convictions of the legal community regard 
as legally unacceptable. Cameron JA in Brisley in concurring with the majority opinion 
went further by adding: 
“I share the misgivings the joint judgment expresses about overhasty or unreflective 
importation into the field of contract law of the concept of 'boni mores'. The 'legal 
convictions of the community' a concept open to misinterpretation and misapplication is 
better replaced, as the Constitutional Court itself has suggested, by the 'appropriate norms 
of the objective value system embodied in the Constitution.”172 
In line with the above, various cases will be traversed to determine where and if when 
public policy was used employed and whether successfully or not. 
In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom173174 the respondent was admitted to the appellants 
hospital for an operation. Upon admission he signed an admission agreement which 
contained a clause exempting the appellant from liability. After the operation, certain 
complications arose which caused the respondent to suffer damages. 
The court in considering the issue of public policy, held that in considering whether a term 
of a contract was in conflict with the interests of the community the Constitution had to be 
taken into account.175 The court however found that the exemption clause (as it related 
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to the negligent conduct) did not conflict with the notion of public interest176 and backed 
the more favourable public policy of pacta sunt servanda.177 
In Swinburne v Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd178179 the court in obiter commented on 
public policy as regards the plaintiff's argument relating to unenforceability of the 
exemption clause for being against public policy, where it noted that: the argument would 
have had some force for the following reasons: (i) the defendant had no bargaining power, 
(ii) the terms of the exclusion were buried in the fine print and not explained to plaintiff, 
(iii) the exemption was contrary to plaintiff's common-law right that defendant secure the 
safety of the building, (iv) the defendant had alternatives to protect himself against liability, 
such as insurance and (v) the constitutional right to bodily integrity ought to be given 
weight in the consideration of the impact of public policy on this type of clause. The court 
however said that on its findings it did not need to “[e]xercise any degree of greater 
activism and ingenuity than has been displayed by judges in the past.”180 The court was 
of the opinion that if the exemption clause was applicable, the argument based on public 
policy would have carried weight, it noted: 
“First, the lease is manifestly what is commonly called a contract of adhesion, in regard to 
the terms of which Mr Swinburne had no real bargaining power. He was presented with the 
lease to sign on the basis that, if he wanted the flat, these were the terms on which it was 
available to him. Second, the terms of the exclusion are buried in the fine print of the 
document and were not explained to him in advance of his signing the lease. He was 
accordingly not alerted to the need to provide his own insurance against the eventuality that 
occurred. Third, the exemption is contrary to the common-law right that a tenant has against 
the landlord, that the latter take reasonable steps to ensure that the leased premises and 
the building in which they are situated are safe for persons living in the building. Fourth, a 
landlord in the position of Newbee Investments is able to protect itself in two ways against 
this type of liability. It can take steps to ensure as best it can that the premises are safe for 
use by the tenants and it can, as did Newbee Investments, insure against liability 
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occasioned by its negligence. Fifth, the constitutional right to bodily integrity ought to be 
given weight in the consideration of the impact of public policy on this type of clause.”181 
In order for an exemption clause to survive the attack based on public policy, it can be 
affirmed that the courts will not uphold exemption clauses against public policy. This 
however depends on the nature of the exemption and its purport and whether it operates 
in extreme unfairness to other related issues also under the umbrella of public policy.182 
4. Good faith 
Christie183 expressed his disappointment in the preface to the fifth edition of his book on 
South African contract law as: 
“In the preface to the fourth edition I was rash enough to express the hope that the judges 
would further develop the concepts of good faith and public policy. This they have done, 
but not in the way I expected. Since Brisley v Drotsky, Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 
and South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers good faith as an abstract value cannot 
be used to intervene in contractual relationships, but public policy still can. To achieve a 
just result there are advantages in using the concept of public policy which our law has 
developed over the centuries and has linked to the Constitution, rather than the less 
familiar concept of good faith. But it will be a mistake to regard the door as forever closed 
…” 
Hutchison further noted that: 
“What emerges quite clearly from recent academic writing and from some of the leading 
cases, is that good faith may be regarded as an ethical value or controlling principle based 
on community standards of decency and fairness that underlies and informs the 
substantive law of contract. It finds expression in various technical rules and doctrines, 
defines their form, content and field of application and provides them with a moral and 
theoretical foundation. Good faith thus has a creative, a controlling and a legitimating or 
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explanatory function. It is not, however, the only value or principle that underlies the law 
of contract; nor, perhaps, even the most important one.”184 
In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom185186 as regards the principles of good faith or bona 
fides the court held that they were not in themselves legal rules. When it came to the 
enforcement of contractual terms, the court had no discretion and did not operate on the 
basis of abstract ideas but on the basis of established legal rules.187 
The abstract notion of good faith it seems has been finally put to rest in South African 
Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd188 where the court held that: 
“In these cases it was held by this Court that, although abstract values such as good faith, 
reasonableness and fairness are fundamental to our law of contract, they do not constitute 
independent substantive rules that courts can employ to intervene in contractual 
relationships. These abstract values perform creative, informative and controlling 
functions through established rules of the law of contract. They cannot be acted upon by 
the courts directly. Acceptance of the notion that judges can refuse to enforce a 
contractual provision merely because it offends their personal sense of fairness and equity 
will give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty. After all, it has been said that fairness 
and justice, like beauty, often lie in the eye of the beholder. In addition, it was held in 
Brisley and Afrox Healthcare that ─ within the protective limits of public policy that the 
courts have carefully developed, and consequent judicial control of contractual 
performance and enforcement ─ constitutional values such as dignity, equality and 
freedom require that courts approach their task of striking down or declining to enforce 
contracts that parties have freely concluded, with perceptive restraint.”189 
5. Unequal bargaining power 
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Bargaining power, or more aptly unequal bargaining power occurs where a contracting 
party seeks to take advantage of illiterate persons with poor language skills, or persons 
from a background of poverty, or through monopolistic trade practices.190 
In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom191192 the court considered the argument from the 
respondent as regards unequal bargaining power where the court held that that inequality 
of bargaining power does not in itself lead to the conclusion that a contractual terms is for 
the benefit of the stronger party, however it is to be assumed that unequal bargaining 
power is a factor that plays a pivotal role in ascertaining the issue of public interest. 
Nevertheless in the current case, there was simply no evidence led which could have 
persuaded the court that the respondent was in a weaker bargaining position than the 
appellant.193 
6. Negligence 
In Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes194 the court stated that “[i]t is trite law that a party to a contract 
may validly exempt himself from liability for negligence, even gross negligence.”195 
In Essa v Divaris196197 the appellant sought to hold the respondent liable for damage 
caused to his lorry due to a fire as a result of a bailment agreement. The agreement was 
concluded verbally and the respondent averred that he was exempt from liability by way 
of notices displayed on his premises.198 
The court had to determine the extent of the exemption clause as regards to the 
negligence alleged by the appellant. As regards the liability for negligence the court in 
quoting an English case stated that if the exemption clause specifically exempts a person 
from its negligence, effect must be given to such a clause, the quoted passage read: 
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“Where the head of damage in respect of which limitation of liability is sought to be 
imposed by such a clause is one which rests on negligence, and nothing else, the clause 
must be construed as extending to that head of damage, because if it were not so 
construed it would lack subject-matter. Where, on the other hand, the head of damage 
may be based on some ground other than that of negligence, the general principle is that 
the clause must be confined to loss occurring through that other cause, to the exclusion 
of loss arising through negligence. The reason for that is that, if a contracting party wishes 
in such a case to limit his liability in respect of negligence, he must do so in clear terms, 
and in the absence of such clear terms the clause is to be construed as relating to a 
different kind of liability and not to liability based on negligence …”199 
The court held that the sole purpose of the exemption clause was to exclude liability for 
negligence and as such effect had to be given to it for otherwise it would be deprived of 
its purpose. 
In Mercurius Motors v Lopez200201 the court laid down the test for negligence as follows202: 
“(a) would a reasonable person, in the same circumstances as the defendant, have 
foreseen the possibility of harm to the plaintiff; 
(b) would a reasonable person have taken steps to guard against that possibility; 
(c) did the defendant fail to take the steps which he or she should reasonably have taken 
to guard against it?”203 
If all three parts of this test receive an affirmative answer, then a person against whom 
an action has been brought would have failed to measure up to the standard of the 
reasonable person and will be adjudged negligent. That fact that the appellant could not 
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account for the keys and that the respondents’ vehicle was the only one missing, had the 
result that the appellant had acted negligently.204 As a result, the appellant was found 
liable for the damages suffered to the respondent. 
In Masstores v Murray & Roberts205206 the appellant alleged the following negligent and 
or grossly negligent conduct resulting in the breach of contract, namely: (i) failure to 
comply with all laws and regulations; (ii) failure to carry out the work in a proper and 
workmanlike manner; (iii) failure to ensure that subcontractors appointed by the 
respondent complied with safety levels; and (iv) failure to ensure that the work was 
executed safely and in such a way as not to endanger the lives and property of people in 
the vicinity of the work. 
As regards negligence the court stated that the exemption clause must be viewed in its 
commercial setting, taking account of the structure and purpose of the entire contract. As 
a result it was clearly intended to exclude the contractor's liability for negligently damaging 
or destroying the existing structure and its contents.207 The court also added that the 
exemption from negligence also excludes that of gross negligence and that there is no 
distinction between the two degrees.208 
7. Breach of contract 
South Africa recognises various forms of breach of contract. The concise definition of a 
breach would be: “[I]f either party, by an act or omission and without lawful excuse, fails 
in any way to honour his or her contractual obligations, he or she commits a breach of 
contract.”209 
In Elgin Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Machinery Suppliers (Pty) Ltd210 the plaintiff 
sued for damages due to the defendants breach (the breach alleged being that of 
                                               
204 At par 35. 
205 94 [2008] ZASCA. 
206 See n 90 above. 
207 At par 24 and par 29. 
208 At par 30. 
209 Hutchison The Law of Contract in South Africa Contract 278. 
210 1993 (3) SA 424 (A). 
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negligence or defective workmanship and that its performance was both totally ineffective 
and useless for the purposes of the agreement) in failing to recondition, test, deliver and 
install certain ship engines it had undertaken to do. The plaintiffs damages it claimed were 
the procurement of new engines, damages suffered for wasted costs and penalties it was 
liable for with its agreement with the ship owner. 
The defendant excepted to the claim based on exemption clause contained in the 
agreement, which it averred excluded its liability.211 
The plaintiff alleged further that the exemption clause could not be given an interpretation 
that should the debtor fail to fulfil his obligations that an exemption clause could come to 
his assistance and render him not liable for a fundamental breach since no benefit 
accrues to the creditor. The court however found that: 
“Its roots are to be found in the outmoded English doctrine of fundamental breach which, 
in the matter of interpreting exemption clauses, has never been part of our law. According 
to the doctrine, if I understand it correctly, the position in English law was at one stage 
thought to be that an exemption clause, no matter how widely expressed, availed the party 
seeking to invoke it when he performed his contract in essential respects. It did not avail 
him when he was guilty of a breach going to the root of the contract. The effect in the 
current state of English law of a 'fundamental breach' of contract upon a provision in the 
contract exempting the party from liability is stated thus by Halsbury's Laws of England 
4th ed vol 9 para 372 at 247-8:”212 
“At one time it was considered that there was a rule of law whereby no exclusion 
clause could protect a party from liability for a "fundamental breach" or breach of 
a "fundamental term" of the contract. It is now clear that no such rule of law exists 
                                               
211 The exemption clause read: 
“Whilst reasonable care will be taken to ensure that first class materials and workmanship will be used in 
the execution of the contract IMS will not be liable for any loss or damages whatsoever, direct or indirect, 
including penalties or liquidated damages, including consequential damages, due to late or defective 
delivery, defective, faulty or negligent workmanship or material, or to any act, default or omission of its 
employees, suppliers or subcontractors, unless specifically negotiated with IMS and confirmed in writing. 
Any claim shall be limited to the repair or replacement of any defective or deficient parts, it being at the 
discretion of IMS whether to repair or replace in every instance. It is a condition precedent to any such claim 
that the defective or deficient parts shall be delivered at the purchaser's expense to an IMS workshop or a 
workshop nominated by IMS.” 
212 At 429. 
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and that the earlier cases are only justifiable on grounds of construction of the 
individual contract involved. The true principle is that in all cases the question is 
one of construction, and the court must determine whether the exclusion clause is 
sufficiently wide to give exemption from the consequences of the breach in 
question. If the clause is sufficiently wide the result may be that the breach in 
question is reduced in effect or not made a breach at all by the terms of the clause, 
notwithstanding that without the clause it would be a breach of sufficient gravity to 
allow the other party to be discharged from the contract.” 
Accordingly, the court held that the concept of a fundamental breach excluding the 
operation of an exemption clause “[i]s irrelevant and alien to the construction of an 
exemption clause and cannot govern its compass …” and that the defendant was entitled 
to rely on the exemption clause.213 
The result of the foregoing is that an exemption clause can protect against liability for a 
fundamental breach of the agreement. 
8. Lawfulness 
In Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another214215 on the issue of claims from 
dependants (the lawfulness of the exemption clause), the court found that it was not 
possible “[t]o exempt the club from such liability as one cannot forgo the autonomous 
claims of dependants.”216 
In Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock217218 the respondent alleged that the indemnity 
clause did not exempt the appellant from liability from its employees negligence (vicarious 
liability) and that the exemption clause relied on was illegal and not enforceable. 
In turning to whether the exemption clause had the effect of legality and not being against 
public policy, the court held that the appellant cannot contract out of legislation 
                                               
213 At 430. 
214 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA). 
215 See n 153 above. 
216 At par 6. 
217 [2007] 1 All SA 133 (SCA). 
218 See n 80 above. 
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implemented to which adventure tour operators such as the appellant were bound to 
abide by and concluded: “Contracting out of this liability altogether would be so perverse 
that we cannot accept that the appellant would have done so.”219 
In Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd220221 the court noted that: 
“[t]he common-cause facts in this case dictate that there can be no question that there was 
a legal duty on the plaintiff to make sure, inasmuch as this was possible, that any product it 
manufactured and supplied complied with South African and international legislation which 
had as its aim ensuring that such product was fit for human consumption.”222 
As a result, exemption clauses, which seek to circumvent legislation, will not be enforced 
and will be seen as pro non scripto. 
9. Common law strict liability 
In Lawrence v Kondotel Inns (Pty) Ltd223 the plaintiff claimed damages (in contract, and 
in the alternative the actio de pauperie224 and further in the alternative based on the 
Aquilian action based on negligence) both in his personal capacity and that of father and 
natural guardian of his minor daughter for extensive injuries sustained during a horse 
riding excursion provided by the defendant. 
The defendant in its defence raised the agreement concluded which included an 
exemption clause that all riders would ride at their own risk. Its defence to the actio de 
pauperie was one of denial and its defence to the Aquilian action was also one of denial 
coupled with an averment of negligence on the part of the plaintiff’s daughter. As a further 
alternative defence, the defendant relied upon volenti non fit injuria on the part of both the 
plaintiffs daughter and the plaintiff. 
                                               
219 At par 16. 
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On the evidence before it, the court found that the hire of the horse was one governed by 
the conditions including the exemption provision225, but held that an exemption clause did 
not exclude liability under the actio de pauperie where a horse had bolted, thus acting, in 
his view, contra naturam sui generis. 
The court held in construing the exemption clause that: 
“[i]ts meaning must be ascertained in the same way as any other clause in a contract by 
seeking to determine the true intention of the parties (Bristow's case supra at 236G - H). 
Principally, it seems to me, that the interpretation of the clause must focus upon what is 
meant by the words 'own risk' and the words 'any accident should occur'. I share the view 
of Beadle CJ in Bristow's case that clearly this was a warning to any would-be rider that 
there was an element of risk in the proposed activity. It seems to me that what was here 
envisaged were the normal or usual occurrences which might occur such as a horse 
stumbling if it caught its foot in a pothole or shying suddenly or being startled by some 
sudden event. It is possible that this type of risk could also have extended to incidents 
during the ride such as inexperienced riders unintentionally jostling one another. Had a 
rider been injured by brushing against a fence post or tree in the course of the ride or been 
unseated by the horse stumbling or being jostled in the circumstances in which I have 
described, it seems to me that those were the sort of events contemplated by the parties. 
I do not think that the clause is intended to cover misconduct on the part of the animal had 
it, for example, turned and bitten the rider or bolted as it did. I would have expected 
language in the clause warning the rider more expressly that the horses had a tendency 
to be frisky or bolt on an intermediate ride and that riders should therefore not undertake 
these rides unless they were capable of controlling their horses.”226 
The court held that when a horse ridden by a young child, who could not control it, had 
bolted, and the child was seriously injured, that the exemption clause did not constitute a 
defence to the claim and the hotel was liable because the risk of bolting had not been 
contemplated by the parents of the child. As a consequence of finding that the exemption 
                                               
225 The exemption clause in question read: 
“All riders ride at their own risk: If any accident should occur, Kondotel or the Management of this hotel will 
not be held responsible.” 
226 At 54. 
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clause did not provide a defence to the actio de pauperie, the court did not have to 
consider the claim based on the lex Aquiliia. 
In Walker v Redhouse227 the respondent claimed damages from the appellant for injuries 
suffered as a result of a horse excursion ‘gone wrong’. 
The respondent claimed in delict through the actio de pauperie. The appellant relied on 
the indemnity signed by the respondent which included an exemption clause228 excluding 
it from liability. 
In determining the aim of the exemption clause, the background circumstances were such 
that the appellant desired to exempt his liability from persons who may sustain injuries 
while partaking in the risk-laden activity of riding a horse.229 In interpreting the ambit of 
the exemption clause, the court held as follows: 
“Redhouse nonetheless contends that the wording of the indemnity in issue in this case 
does not cover liability for injury caused in abnormal circumstances not contemplated by 
the parties: it is not injury from 'any cause whatsoever'. In my view, this interpretation 
strains the wording of the indemnity. It requires words to be read in which limit the causes 
of injury. There is nothing to suggest that that was the intention of either of the parties. 
The indemnity provides that Walkerson's stables shall not be liable for loss sustained 'as 
a result of my injury in the course of my horse riding'. The language clearly covers all 
liability resulting from, or caused by, the activity of riding a horse, whether or not the injury 
is caused by a horse's acting out of character. This interpretation is consistent with the 
second sentence of the indemnity in which Redhouse acknowledged that she was aware 
of the risks involved in horse riding and accepted them. The extent to which such a 
provision may be enforceable (for example where the person indemnified has contracted 
out of liability for the negligent performance of a contract does not arise here. There was 
                                               
227 2007 (3) SA 514 (SCA). 
228 The exemption clause read as follows: 
“Walkersons Stables 
Terms and conditions 
I hereby confirm that neither Walkersons or Critchley Hackle, or any member of their staff shall be liable to 
me, my estate or dependants for any loss or damage sustained as a result of my death or injury to my 
person or property in the course of my horse riding about the property of Walkersons. 
I acknowledge that I am aware of the risks involved in horse riding and accept such risks.” 
229 At par 12. 
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certainly no evidence of negligence or any wrongdoing on the part of Walker or his 
staff.”230 
The court came to the conclusion that even if the appellant was liable under the pauperian 
action, the exemption clause had the effect that the appellant had effectively contracted 
out of any liability sustained by the respondent. 
10. Conclusion 
This chapter shows over the years that there had been various defences in attempts to 
exclude or mitigate the effects of exemption clauses and instances where reliance is 
sought in order to uphold exemption clauses. It illustrates the principles that have been 
formulated by the courts in each of these instances and provides a succinct outline of 
what substantive law can be authoritatively applied and when it can be applied. However, 
the application of substantive law either in reliance or as a defence in relation to an 
exemption clause will in all likelihood be decided against the specific wording and intent 
of the exemption clause.  
                                               
230 At par 19. 
55 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
1. A proper approach to exemption clauses 
From the foregoing, various cases have been examined through various legal precepts. 
In drawing this dissertation to a conclusion, it may be prudent to end with Naidoo v 
Birchwood Hotel,231 as this case in its opening stanza deals with the question “[a]s to the 
proper approach to be taken to exemption clauses under the new constitutional 
dispensation”.232 
In casu, the plaintiff sustained bodily injuries as a result of a gate that fell onto him while 
on the defendants premises (a hotel). The plaintiff alleging that the defendant was 
negligent while the defendant denied its liability on the basis that disclaimers were 
prominently displayed and further that the hotel register included an exemption clause 
exempting it from liability.233 
The court affirmed that a person instituting a delictual claim, bears the onus of proving 
negligence on the part of the defendant. A defendant, insofar as its defence is based on 
a contract in terms of which liability for negligence is excluded, bears the onus of 
establishing the terms of the contract, and that it did everything reasonably necessary to 
bring these terms to the attention of the plaintiff.234 
As regards negligence, the court restated the principles formulated in Kruger v 
Coetzee.235 The court went further and stated that the test for negligence essentially is 
                                               
231 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ). 
232 At par 1. 
233 The reverse of the hotel registration contained the following at clause 5: 
“The guest hereby agrees on behalf of himself and the members of his party that it is a condition of his/their 
occupation of the Hotel that the Hotel shall not be responsible for any injury to, or death of, any person or 
the loss or destruction of or damage to any property on the premises, whether arising from fire, theft or any 
cause, and by whomsoever caused or arising from the negligence (gross or otherwise) or wrongful acts of 
any person in the employment of the Hotel.” 
234 At par 7. 
235 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) 430. See n 203 above. 
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whether the conduct complained of falls short of the standard of care required of a 
reasonable person236. In applying the above criteria, the court held that: 
“Property owners are obliged to ensure that their property does not present undue hazards 
to the public who enter and use the premises. This duty is even greater in respect of property 
such as a hotel, which is designed for use by the public. The hotel is obliged to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the public is safe.”237 
In determining whether the exemption clause was binding on the plaintiff, the court 
reaffirmed the caveat subscriptor rule.238 It is also of importance to mention that the 
plaintiff conceded that he was bound by the document he signed.239 The court also 
affirmed that the wording of the exemption clause was clear and unambiguous.240 
The court then sought to differentiate the present case from Durban's Water Wonderland 
(Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another241 and Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom242 on the facts 
where it stated: “[T]hose facts are distinguishable from the facts in this case, where the 
plaintiff was merely a guest exiting a hotel, an activity that could by no stretch of the 
imagination be considered dangerous.”243 In further dissenting with Afrox Healthcare Bpk 
v Strydom244 the court held that: 
“While the court in Afrox was of the view that the principle of contractual autonomy was 
paramount and the exemption clause was therefore not contrary to public interest, this 
finding must now be seen through the lens of the Constitution. In Brisley v Drotsky the 
observation was made that it was not difficult to envisage a case where certain contracts 
offend against the new social compact that the Constitution embodies. Decisions that 
proclaim that limits of contractual sanctity lie at the borders of public policy would receive 
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enhanced force and clarity in the light of the Constitution and the values embodied in the 
Bill of Rights…”245 
The court likened the exemption clause to that of a time limitation clause found in 
Barkhuizen v Napier246 and held that: 
“[I]n my view exemption clauses that exclude liability for bodily harm in hotels and other 
public places have the effect, generally, of denying a claimant judicial redress.”247 
and 
“[A] guest in a hotel does not take his life in his hands when he exits through the hotel 
gates. To deny him judicial redress for injuries he suffered in doing so, which came about 
as a result of the negligent conduct of the hotel, offends against notions of justice and 
fairness.”248 
In obiter the court remarked that exemption clauses for negligently causing bodily injury 
may not pass constitutional muster249 and as a ratio that a clause that limits a persons’ 
right to judicial redress, or put differently, whether based upon the facts of a case, 
enforcement of an exemption clause would result in an injustice, the enforcement of such 
a clause was unfair and unjust.250 
The conclusion to be drawn from this case may be aptly summarised by completing the 
quote referred to earlier251, the latter part reading: 
“[f]aced with this abuse of power, by the strong against the weak, by the use of the small 
print of the conditions, the Judges did what they could to put a curb on it. They still had 
before them the idol, ‘freedom of contract’. They still knelt down and worshipped it, but 
they concealed under their cloaks a secret weapon. They used it to stab the idol in the 
back. This weapon was called ‘the true construction of the contract’. They used it with 
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great skill and ingenuity. They used it so as to depart from the natural meaning of the 
words of the exemption clause and to put on them a strained and unnatural construction. 
In case after case, they said that the words were not strong enough to give the big concern 
exemption from liability, or that in the circumstances the big concern was not entitled to 
rely on the exemption clause … But when the clause was itself reasonable and gave rise 
to a reasonable result, the Judges upheld, at any rate when the clause did not exclude 
liability entirely but only limited it to a reasonable amount.”252 
2. Recommendation 
In answering the questions posed at the beginning of the paper253 (bearing in mind that, 
in law there is no clear right or wrong answer), the following advice is offered: 
 In bringing an action, ensure that, depending on the cause of action pleaded the 
onus is properly discharged, including the arduous task of proving that a term in a 
contract did not exist. 
 If you are in the position of wanting to exempt yourself from liability, ensure that 
the clause is drafted and checked by a lawyer with experience in such matters.254 
 Be sure to read the agreement to ensure that not only the essentialia is adequately 
captured, but that there are no consequences with terms included in an agreement 
not specifically negotiated. 
 If an issue of substantive law could either vindicate or exonerate your claim (i.e. 
breach or public policy issues) be sure to ensure that the matter is fully ventilated 
and adequate evidence is led to prove the assertion relied on. 
Finally, perhaps a silent petition to Themis255 to ensure that the judge presiding over the 
case has the temerity to build a case on behalf of an aggrieved party where none seem 
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to exist256, or as a last resort to come across a judge257 that can assist in building the 
bridge from the past to the present258 and in so doing construe the facts of the case and 
the related legal issues in line with the Constitution and its spirit and purport.  
                                               
256 In this regard, compare the minority judgment of Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) 
356–381. 
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Judging Politics in South Africa at 30–31. 
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